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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

The board of tax appeals, it is said, is preparing a “docket” and hopes to
start hearing cases about September first. One of the reasons for the per
sistence of some of our senators in their desire to investigate the bureau of
internal revenue is said to be that the final disposition of tax cases may be
facilitated. If this purpose were the only one and its pursuit were not made
with so much apparent partisan animus, the investigations would be most
praiseworthy and would undoubtedly have the hearty support of the public.
It may be due largely to the inevitable eagerness of the Washington news
writers for snappy news stories that the more ignoble purposes supposed to be
animating those insisting upon an investigation have been made to appear the
paramount reasons for their efforts. That there have been irregularities in
the disposition of tax cases is entirely probable, but that these instances have
been rare and the exception to the rule is undoubtedly true. If the govern
ment could be made to adopt a more liberal policy with reference to the sal
aries paid to its worthy workers and thereby raise the level of efficiency, it is
believed that the net result in revenue would show to greater advantage than
has been the case heretofore and tax cases would be disposed of more speedily.
It is difficult to comprehend what good purpose is served by computing
additional taxes and attempting to assess them after a thorough field audit has
been made on the theory that on every moot point the taxpayer should be made
to reveal to the bureau of internal revenue why he should not pay the pro
posed additional amount. If the revenue agents were more painstaking in
their work, much time would be saved in the collection of the right amount of
tax due from taxpayers and much extra expense would be saved the taxpayer.
It has been reported that when Acting Commissioner Winston addressed
the new board of tax appeals, he stressed the necessity of the government for
the revenue from the tax cases that the board is about to decide. This atti
tude is one that has caused the former committee on appeals and review to be
criticized as “too technical minded” and as having “a bureau-of-internalrevenue mind.” No one would wish any department of the bureau of internal
revenue to be lax in its assessment of taxes properly due, but, on the other hand,
no one wishes the bureau to function in such a way that it collects taxes that
were not contemplated by the framers of the revenue acts. There have been
rulings by the treasury department based on interpretations that seem quite
contrary to the intent of the law.
In view of the apparent intention of congress in authorizing a body of care
fully chosen men to hear the taxpayer’s side of a case to have this body attempt
to do justice to him as well as to the government in deciding a tax matter, it
seems unfortunate from any standpoint that one of the first ideas forced upon
the new board’s attention is that, without the additional taxes which the bureau
is attempting to collect, government revenues will be inadequate and a treasury
deficiency may eventuate. If this idea is to animate the board in its delibera
tions the final settlement of tax cases will not be facilitated, the courts will be
resorted to more frequently than they have been in the past and the final dis
position of the cases will be set far into the future.
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SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS

A transfer in trust, where the beneficiaries were to come into possession at
the end of a period greater than the grantor’s expectancy of life, was included
in the gross estate of the grantor. (Shukert et al. v. Allen.)
In determining whether corporations are affiliated, "substantially all the
stock” means substantially all the voting stock. (In matter of Temtor Corn
and Fruit Products Company.)
Federal taxes are to be paid prior to payment of the taxpayer’s general
creditors. (Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Johnson Shipyards Corporation.)
A review division has been created in the office of the solicitor of internal
revenue, which is to hear cases and attempt to dispose of them prior to their
hearing by the board of tax appeals. (Bureau Memo. No. 289.)
Notes received by a corporation as commissions for lending money are
includible in gross income in year received at their fair discount value and not
at their face value, the recovery of the discount being income at date of its
receipt; and if such notes are not marketable at a fair discount value, no income
is realized at date notes are received, but only when payment is received.
Contributions to social settlements and corporations carrying on similar
work are deductible.
The right to inspect a partnership return will not be granted to one who is
not shown in the partnership return as being a partner.
Amortization is not allowed on equipment purchased to facilitate trans
portation to aviation field by transportation company on the assumption that
as it did not “produce” transportation therefore it did not produce articles
contributing to the prosecution of the war. (U. S. district court decision in
re Hampton and Langley Field Railway Company v. Noel, Collector.)
Deduction may be made for stock held to be worthless because of bank
ruptcy in year in which worthlessness is ascertained by a taxpayer. This
ascertainment need not necessarily await the termination of the receivership.
(U. S. district court decision in re John Lyle Harrington, bankrupt.)
TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3602, June 16, 1924.)
Effective date of repeal of certain titles and sections of the revenue act of 1921.

Under the provisions of section 1100 (a) of the revenue act of 1924 the follow
ing titles and sections of the revenue act of 1921 are repealed as of the date and
time specified:
Title II (called “income tax”) as of January 1, 1924.
Title IV (called “estate tax”), 4.01 p. m., Washington time, June 2, 1924,
the date and time that the act was signed by the President at Washington,
D. C.
Title V (called “tax on telegraph and telephone messages”) except subdi
vision (d) of section 500, on midnight, July 2, 1924.
Sections 602 and 603 of title VI (being the taxes on certain beverages and
constituent parts thereof), 4.01 p. m., Washington time, June 2, 1924.
Title VII (called “tax on cigars, tobacco and manufactures thereof”), 4.01
p. m., Washington time, June 2, 1924.
Title VIII (called “tax on admissions and dues”), on midnight, July 2,
1924 .
Sections 901, 902, 903, and 904 of title IX (being certain excise taxes), 4.01
p. m., Washington time, June 2, 1924.
Section 900 of title IX (being certain excise taxes) and section 905 of title
IX (being the tax on jewelry and similar articles), on midnight, July 2, 1924.
Title X (called “special taxes”), on June 30, 1924.
Title XI (called “stamp taxes”), on midnight, July 2, 1924.
Section 1100 (b) of the revenue act of 1924 provides that—
The parts of the revenue act of 1921 which are repealed by this act shall
(except as provided in sections 280 and 316 and except as otherwise specifi
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cally provided in this act) remain in force for the assessment and collec
tion of all taxes imposed by such act, and for the assessment, imposition
and collection of all interest, penalties, or forfeitures which have accrued
or may accrue in relation to any such taxes, and for the assessment and
collection, to the extent provided in the revenue act of 1921, of all taxes
imposed by prior income, war-profits, or excess-profits tax acts, and for
the assessment, imposition and collection of all interest, penalties, or
forfeitures which have accrued or may accrue in relation to any such
taxes. In the case of any tax imposed by any part of the revenue act of
1921 repealed by this act, if there is a tax imposed by this act in lieu thereof,
the provision imposing such tax shall remain in force until the correspond
ing tax under this act takes effect under the provisions of this act.

(T. D. 3604, June 16, 1924.)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of supreme court.
1. Income—Insurance policy—Beneficiary.
Proceeds of a policy of insurance upon the life of an officer of a corporation
paid to the corporation as beneficiary are not taxable as income.
2. Insurance.
A policy of insurance by a corporation upon the life of one of its officers is
not a wagering contract.
The following decision of the supreme court of the United States in the case
of United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co. is published for the information
of internal-revenue officers and others concerned:

Supreme Court of the United States.

No. 477.

October Term, 1923.

United States, appellant, v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co.
Appeal from the court of claims.

(May 26, 1924.)

Mr. Chief Justice Taft delivered the opinion of the court:
The Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co. sued the United States in the court of
claims to recover $55,153.89, with interest, as taxes illegally assessed on the
proceeds of two life insurance policies paid to it as the beneficiary on the death
in 1918 of the insured, Robert Biddle, 2d. Biddle was elected president of the
company in February, 1917. He was then 37 years of age, in good health, and
had for nearly 20 years held various offices in the Biddle Hardware Co., which
had merged with the appellee company in January, 1914. He was a man of
ability, energy, and initiative, and was so regarded in the hardware trade. The
returns from the company’s business under Biddle’s management had been
much increased. At the instance of the board of directors and the expense of
the company he took out the two policies for $50,000 each. They were term
policies for five years. The company intended thus to make secure its financial
position, and to indemnify itself against losses to its earning power in the event
of Biddle’s death.
The revenue act of 1918, which was passed February 24, 1919 (4oStat. 1057,
ch. 18), in prescribing the income to be taxed, deals first with individuals, from
section 212 to section 228, inclusive. Then follows provision for the rate of
income tax on corporations, beginning with section 230. Section 233 (a) says
“that in the case of a corporation subject to the tax imposed by section 230
the term ‘gross income’ means the gross income as defined in section 213,” with
certain exceptions not here material. Section 213 defines the gross income for
individuals as follows:
That for the purposes of this title (except as otherwise provided in section
233) the term “gross income”—
(a) Includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, Or com
pensation for personal service ... of whatever kind and in whatever
form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales,
or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership
or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securi
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ties, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or
profits, and income derived from any source whatever . .
but
(If) Does not include the following items, which shall be exempt from taxation
under this title:
(1) The proceeds of life insurance policies paid upon the death of the insured
to individual beneficiaries or to the estate of the insured.
The treasury department, construing these sections, held that the proceeds
of insurance policies, paid to a beneficiary which was a corporation, were not
exempted and were included as “gains . . . from any source whatever.”
Under this ruling the appellee was forced to pay a tax of $84,737.95 on the pro
ceeds of the two policies of $97,947.28. The commissioner of internal revenue
reduced this amount by $29,584.06, in accordance with the powers conferred
upon him by sections 327 and 328 of the revenue act of 1918 to reduce the rate
of taxation in cases of unusual hardship. There remained, however, the sum of
$55,153.89, which tax the appellees paid under protest, and for this, with
interest, the court of claims gave judgment to the appellee.
We think the treasury department erred in assuming that congress intended,
by sections 233 and 213, to distinguish between individual beneficiaries and
corporate beneficiaries in including the proceeds of life insurance policies as
within gross income. We think the two sections have no such purpose. Sec
tion 213 primarily applies only to the taxing of individuals. The union of
proceeds of life insurance payable to individual beneficiaries and to the estate
of the assured was thus intended to emphasize the exclusion from taxation in
the hands of individuals of all such proceeds and to leave no doubt of it. The
meaning is the same as if the clause had read “the proceeds of life insurance
shall not be included in gross income, whether they are paid to individual
beneficiaries or to the estate of the assured.” When congress came to deal with
the gross income of corporations it made use of section 213 by reference and
grafted it on to 233. It is reasonable that the purpose of section 213 to exclude
entirely the proceeds of life insurance policies from taxation in the case of
individuals should be given the same effect in adapting its application to cor
porations, and that such proceeds should be so excluded whether by the direc
tion of the insured they were to go to specially named beneficiaries or were to
inure to the estate of the insured.
Nor do we find any difficulty with the expression in paragraph (b) which
exempts proceeds of life insurance from gross income. The word is used not to
indicate that they would be otherwise included in the income to be taxed, but
only to make clear that the gross does not include them.
It is earnestly pressed upon us that proceeds of life insurance paid on the
death of the insured are in fact capital and can not be taxed as income under the
sixteenth amendment.—Eisner v. Macomber (252 U. S. 189, 207); Merchants
Loan and Trust Co. v. Smietanka (255 U. S. 58, 518). We are not required to
meet this question. It is enough to sustain our construction of the act to say
that proceeds of a life insurance policy paid on the death of the insured are not
usually classed as income.
Life insurance in such a case as the one before us is valid and is not a wagering
contract. There was certainly an insurable interest on the part of the company
in the life of Biddle.—Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Board (115 Va.
836); Keckley v. Coshocton C. Co. (86 Ohio State); Mechanics National Bank
v. Commins (72 N. H. 12); United Security Life and Trust Co. v. Brown (270
Penn. state, 264). Life insurance in such a case is like that of fire and marine
insurance, a contract of indemnity.—Central Bank of Washington v. Hume
(128 U. S. 195). The benefit to be gained by death has no periodicity. It is a
substitution of money value for something permanently lost either in a house, a
ship, or a life. Assuming without deciding that congress could call the proceeds
of such indemnity income, and validly tax it as such, we think that in view of
the popular conception of the life insurance as resulting in a single addition of
a total sum to the resources of the beneficiary, and not in a periodical return,
such a purpose on its part should be express, as it certainly is not here.
This view is strengthened by the fact that under section 402, page 1097, of
the same revenue law of 1918, a decedent’s estate tax is levied, with rates rang
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ing from 1 per cent to 25 per cent on the net estate which is made to include
(per. f) "the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under policies taken
out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the extent of the excess over
$40,000 of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under
policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life. ” The result of the con
struction put by the government upon sections 233, 330, and 213 would be to
impose a double tax on the proceeds of the two policies in this case over and
above $40,000, i. e., an income tax and an estate tax. Such a duplication even
in an exigent war-tax measure is to be avoided unless required by express
words.
The judgment of the court of claims is affirmed.
(T. D. 3607, June 20, 1924.)
Estate tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court.
1. Deductions—Administration expenses—Property taxes.
County and city ad valorem taxes imposed upon personal property in the
hands of the executor after the decedent’s death are not deductible as adminis
tration expenses within the meaning of section 403 (a) (1), revenue act of
1918.

2. Estate Taxes—Deductions—Claims against the estate.
Claims against the estate within the meaning of section 403 (a) (1), revenue
act of 1918, are such demands or claims of a pecuniary nature which could
have been enforced against the decedent during his lifetime and county and
city ad valorem taxes assessed upon personalty in the hands of the executor
after decedent’s death do not constitute a deductible claim.
The following decision of the United States district court for the eastern
district of North Carolina in the case of John Sprunt Hill and Jones Fuller,
executors of George W. Watts, deceased, v. Gilliam Griscom, collector of internal
revenue for the eastern district of North Carolina, is published for the information
of internal-revenue officers and others concerned:
District court of the United States for the eastern district of North
Carolina.
John Sprunt Hill and Jones Fuller, executors of George W. Watts, deceased, plain
tiffs, v. Gilliam Griscom, collector of internal revenue for the eastern district of
North Carolina, and Gilliam Griscom, individually, defendant.
Decided May 10, 1924.
Connor, district judge: Plaintiffs allege that George W. Watts, lately a
citizen and resident of the city and county of Durham, N. C., died on the 7th
day of March, 1921, leaving a last will and testament, wherein he nominated
and appointed plaintiffs executors thereto. That said will was duly admitted
to probate in the appropriate court of said city and county, and plaintiffs duly
qualified as executors and entered upon administering, according to the pro
visions of said will and executing the trusts imposed upon them thereby, the
personal estate and property of their testator. That among other duties im
posed upon them as such executors was the duty of paying to the United States
government, after the appraisal of the value of said estate, as provided by the
revenue act of 1918 (40 Stat. at large, 1057), the estate or succession tax im
posed upon said estate by the laws of the United States. That, in order to
arrive at the amount of said tax, for which the estate of their testator was liable,
it was necessary to appraise and fix the net value of said estate at the date of
the death of their testator. Plaintiffs had several conferences with the duly
authorized officers of the government, upon whom was imposed the duty of
making appraisal of said estate, as the basis for fixing the amount of tax due
thereon. The net value of the estate was appraised without controversy,
except as to one item, to wit, the amount of tax which was assessed against the
personal estate of their testator, in the possession of plaintiffs, by the county
and city of Durham, under and pursuant to the provisions of the revenue laws
of the state of North Carolina, for the year 1921, amounting to $105,110.64,
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which plaintiffs were required to pay and which they did pay, on the 28th day of
November, 1921. That, as required by the revenue laws of North Carolina,
said personal property was listed for taxation by plaintiffs, in said city on May
1, 1921, and the tax thereon levied or assessed as provided by the laws of North
Carolina. The county tax thereon was levied or assessed on September 7,1921,
and such tax so assessed and levied became a lien or charge upon the personal
property in the possession of plaintiffs, having priority over and in preference
to the claims of creditors, devisees, or distributees of said estate. That plain
tiffs were required, by the laws of North Carolina, to list, as of January 1,1921,
a complete itemized list of debt owing by their testator, January 1,1921, for the
purpose of deducting against such debts, solvent credits, all as of January 1,
1921 (public laws of North Carolina, 1921, ch. 38, sec. 40). That the taxes
levied upon said personal property were the personal liability of their testator as
of January 1, 1921, and upon his death a charge upon the whole of his estate in
the possession of his executors.
Plaintiffs contended before the officers of the United States and now contend
that this sum of money, to wit, $105,110.64, was an item which should be de
ducted from the appraised value of said estate before the net value of same was
fixed and appraised, or that in any event the said $105,110.64 was a liability of
their testator, or of his estate or a claim or charge thereon, or expense thereof of
the administration which plaintiffs, as executors, were required to pay before
making distribution thereof or pay any legacies to the legatees named in the
will of their testator. That, during the month of June, 1922, plaintiffs, as
executors, with their attorneys, applied to the treasury department at Wash
ington for a reduction in the assessment of the value of said personal estate to
the amount of $105,110.64 paid as tax to the city and county of Durham, as
hereinbefore alleged, and a consequent reduction of the estate, or succession tax,
which plaintiffs were required to pay to the United States. That a hearing was
granted by the estate-tax unit of the estate-tax division of the treasury depart
ment of the United States. That said estate-tax division, regarding itself as
bound by the regulations of the treasury department, refused to reduce the
assessed or appraised value of said estate, on account of the payment by plain
tiffs of said tax to the city and county of Durham, or to abate any part of said
tax paid as aforesaid. Plaintiffs were notified thereof and required to pay the
estate tax assessed against said estate, including the tax on said sum of
$105,110.64. That, in obedience to the demand of defendant collector of in
ternal revenue for the eastern district of North Carolina, and under compulsion
of the threatened enforcement of said tax by distraint and process, with the
penalties incident thereto, plaintiffs on, or thereafter on, the 1st day of Septem
ber, 1922, paid to the defendant the balance of the full amount of the estate tax
upon the estate of their testator, including the sum of $26,277.66, being the
amount of tax imposed upon and attributed to the sum of $105,110.64, paid to
the county and city of Durham, North Carolina, upon the personal property
of the estate of their testator, as hereinbefore set forth. Said amount of
$26,277.66 was paid to defendant by plaintiffs as executors, under protest,
and the sum was accepted by defendant with notice of the claim that said pay
ment was made under protest, etc. That plaintiffs advised defendant at the
time of making such payment that they would, in the appropriate way, contest
their liability for said amount as instituting an action to recover said amount
of $26,277.66, demanded and paid as aforesaid. That the appraised value of
the estate of said George W. Watts was such that the sum of $105,110.64, if
it was a part of the net value of said estate, was subject to, and liable for, tax
at the rate of 25 per cent. That if said amount shall be allowed as a deduction
and it shall be deducted before the net value of said estate is ascertained and
fixed, the amount of estate tax overpaid to the United States would be 25 per
cent, or the sum of $26,277.66.
Claim for abatement or refund of said amount was duly filed and presented to
the commissioner and upon hearing had before the estate-tax unit, and the
same was rejected by the commissioner. Plaintiffs have, therefore, exhausted
their remedy in the treasury department of the United States, have complied
with all of the preliminary requirements of section 1318 of the revenue act of
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1921. That more than six months elapsed from the date of filing the claim with
the commissioner, and more than six months have elapsed since the commis
sioner disallowed or rejected said claim. The action is brought under and
pursuant to the act permitting such action, etc. Defendant demurred to the
complaint. The case was submitted to the court upon the complaint and
demurrer.
It is conceded that the sole question presented upon the pleadings is whether,
under the provisions of section 403 of the revenue act of 1918 (40 Stat. at large
1057), the tax paid by the plaintiffs on the value of the personal estate of their
testator to the city and county of Durham for the year 1921, required by therevenue law of North Carolina, 1921, as of May 1, 1921, may be deducted from
the appraised value of the estate made as provided by the revenue act of 1918.
This question is narrowed to the question whether such tax comes within the
meaning of the words "administration expenses or claims against the estate.”
The defendant contends that the ad valorem tax assessed against the property
of the testator in the possession of the executors as of May 1,1921, did not con
stitute “a claim against the estate,” the testator having died March 7, 1921,
and the value of the estate, as the basis for assessing the “estate tax,” being
fixed as of that date, from which certain specified deductions may be made.
It is abundantly settled by decisions of the supreme court that the estate or
succession tax imposed by the revenue act is not a tax upon the property of the
decedent, but is a tax imposed upon the transfer of the net estate of every de
cedent, graduated according to the value, as ascertained by deducting, in the
case of a resident, from the value of the estate, fixed at the date of his death,
“funeral expense, claims against the estate, administration expenses”—New
York Trust Co. v. Eisner (256 U. S. 345); Creiner v. Lewellyn (258 U. S. 384).
It is true, as suggested by plaintiffs, that by the provisions of the statute of
North Carolina the executor is required, to enable all persons having claims
against the estate to present them within a reasonable time, fixed by the statute
at one year, to retain the estate in his possession during that period. (Consoli
dated statutes 101, 105, and 109.)
It is also true that the executor is required by the revenue law of the state to
list the property of the estate in his possession for taxations and to pay the tax
assessed upon it. (Sec. 242.) (Machinery act of 1921.) It is also true that,
in his final settlement, the executor is entitled to deduct the amount of tax so
paid by him as his other expenses lawfully incurred in the administration of
the estate. These propositions are all abundantly sustained by the authorities
cited by plaintiff’s counsel and decided cases in this and other states. It is held
by the supreme court of this state that expenses incident to the administration
of the estate of a deceased person are not debts or claims against the decedent
but are the personal liabilities of the executors, which are allowed him as dis
bursement for the expenses of administration of the estate.
In Knowlton v. Moore (178 U. S. 4, 48), Mr. Justice White reviews the history
of “death duties,” "estate taxes” in this and other countries. He thus con
cludes the discussion of the subject:
Although different modes of assessing such duties prevail, and although they
have different accidental names, such as probate duties, stamp duties, taxes on
the transaction or the act of passing an estate, or a succession, legacy taxes,
estate taxes, or privilege taxes, nevertheless taxes of this nature in all countries
rest their essence upon the principles that death is the generating source from
which the particular taxing power takes its being and that it is the power to
transmit, or the transmission from the dead to the living, on which such taxes are
more immediately rested.
In United States v. Perkins (163 U. S. 625), it is said:
If it be true that the right of testamentary disposition is purely statutory,
the state has a right to require a contribution to the public treasury before the
bequest shall take effect. Thus the tax is not on the property in the ordinary
sense of the term, but upon the right to dispose of it, and it is not until it has
yielded its contribution to the state that it becomes the property of the legatee.
From this postulate, which is not now a subject of debate, it logically follows
that the state may fix both the time and principle, or method, by which the tax
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is to be ascertained. The act of 1918 does this by directing the executor to
make a return of the gross value of his testator’s estate to the designated officer
with such information as will enable him to ascertain and fix the net value of
the estate as of the date of the death of his testator, and this amount, when
ascertained by making the specified deductions, becomes the basis upon which
the tax is assessed. From this amount, among other specified items, the execu
tor is directed to deduct “administration expenses and claims against the
estate.”
It would seem clear that the ad valorem tax paid by the executors to the
county and city of Durham do not come within the term “administration
expenses,” nor are such taxes claims against the estate, at the date of the death
of the testator, prior to the date at which such taxes are assessed and levied.
A claim against the estate, as defined by a number of cases, cited by counsel
for defendant, are such demands or claims of a pecuniary nature which could
have been enforced against the decedent during his life.
While not conclusive upon the court, the construction put upon Federal
statutes by the departments, having their administration in charge, by making
regulations “adopted for their administration ” have the force and effect of law,
if they be not in conflict with express statutory provisions.—Maryland Casu
alty Co. v. United States (251 U. S. 342). Art. 45, regulations 37, 1921, regard
ing deductions, is persuasive:
Claims against the estate.—The amounts that may be deducted under this
heading are such only as represent personal obligations of the decedent existing
at the time of his death, whether matured or not. Other obligations are not
deductible. Only such claims as are actually enforceable against the estate
may be deducted.
While I do not accept portions of the argument found in the well-considered
brief of defendant’s counsel, as formulated by them, especially that portion
which places upon the plaintiffs, to the extent claimed, the burden of maintain
ing their contention, I am constrained, in the light of the current of decisions
bearing upon the question, to hold that plaintiff can not maintain this action.
The demurrer is sustained. Judgment will be entered accordingly.
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